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Analýza zahraniční politiky Tonyho Blaira

Analysis of Tony Blair's Foreign Policy

Beáta Veisová

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Prohlašuji, že jsem práci zpracovala samostatně a použila jen uvedených pramenů a literatury.

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List of abbreviations

ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
KFOR	Kosovo Force
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
UK	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UN	United Nations
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNSCOM	United Nations Special Commission
US	United States of America

Introduction

When we hear the name Tony Blair, what is the first thing we think about? For most of us it is Iraq. It would be a huge simplification to narrow down the ten years he served as the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (UK) to this one word. Over the ten years Tony Blair was in office, the system of international relations as we knew it had changed completely.

The first decade after the end of the Cold War was full of high expectations, hopes for changes and great challenges for the newly established world order. From the very beginning of the new era, the international community had to face tasks and questions that had not come up in the previous years. Therefore, there was not a verified pattern how to handle these situations and new solutions needed to be carried out. We should remember the new ethnic conflicts that emerged in Africa, the Caucasus and the Balkans. Such as the Rwandan Genocide, which the United Nations (UN) failed to stop, the Yugoslav Wars known for war crimes and human rights violations or the Somali Civil War, which is going on for two decades. The 1990s were also characteristic of the rising number of terrorist incidents that led to the climax in a form of 9/11 attacks. Another milestone was set during the 1990 – it is said to be the beginning of the real Information Age. With the digitalisation of society comes also the dark side. This dark side has become to be known as cyber crime – another new phenomenon that the international community had to learn how to cope with.

This thesis will focus on the foreign policy conducted during the ten years Tony Blair served as the Prime Minister of the UK. The aim is to analyse whether the proclamations from the manifestos, mission statements and major speeches were corresponding with the real actions

executed by the Labour government between years 1997-2007. The analysis also focuses on whether the set goals of those actions conducted were actually fulfilled. To maintain better understating of the thesis, the manifestos, mission statements and major speeches are put in the context with other events; they are not all mentioned in the first chapter.

The first chapter starts with a brief description of how Tony Blair became the leader of the Labour Party and how his desire to change created the New Labour. It also covers briefly the General Election in 1997 – the first election after eighteen years that the Labour Party has won. The thesis sums up the basics of Blair's style as the Prime Minister. The main focus of this chapter lays on what helped to form the framework for British foreign policy. It stresses out the importance of advisers and co-workers to Tony Blair, as he had no previous experience of either minister job, or foreign affairs. It covers the discomfiture in the first months of Labour government concerning foreign policy, precisely the disputes over statements of Tony Blair and his Foreign Secretary Robin Cook. It looks into two major speeches – Cook's mission statement presented in May 1997 and Blair's speech at the Mansion House in November later that year. The first chapter shows the situation as it was before the proclaimed theory was questioned by any real action.

The second part of the thesis analyses practical examples of consequences of foreign policy that was carried out by the Labour government. It also describes how Blair's view on foreign policy changed in the light of executed measures. This is reflected in the speeches and statements given by Tony Blair or his authorised colleagues. The thesis describes five military conflicts that the UK was dragged into during Blair's premiership. It follows the chronological order of the conflicts. All five chapters of this part contain the background of respective conflict, the

involvement of the UK in the conflict, the attitude of the international community towards respective conflict, whether the goals of those interventions were fulfilled and a reflection on what the motives of Tony Blair were and whether those motives were corresponding with his statements.

The first conflict to be addressed is the ongoing dispute in Iraq culminating with the operation Desert Fox in December 1998. It was the first encounter with international scene for Tony Blair and also his first encounter with Saddam Hussein.

The second conflict Britain was involved in during Blair's premiership was the dispute over Kosovo. The conflict was crucial for shaping Blair's view of foreign affairs and Britain's involvement in them. During the escalation of the conflict Blair gave one of the defining speeches. It was the doctrine of international community he formulated in Chicago in 1999.

The case of Sierra Leone was the most successful case of humanitarian interventions for Blair. British troops were originally only a back up force for the UN contingent. As the conflict was escalating, UK soldiers were in the lead of the actions. The international community favoured the process and even the result of the mission.

The events of September 11th 2001 and the following military action towards Afghanistan meant a turning point in Blair's vision of the international community. The whole concept of western countries as harbours of democracy was shaken by the attacks. And Tony Blair had to become stricter with his demands on the international stage.

The last conflict addressed in the thesis is the second conflict with Iraq that Tony Blair encountered. Alongside the US Britain entered the

war in Iraq on March 20th 2003. Prior and following this day was marked with a lot of controversies. Result of those controversies was the inquiry in 2009.

The thesis is based on both printed sources and internet sources. The most references are directed to the publication from John Kampfner, Blair's Wars. This publication is probably the most complex work concerning the issue of foreign policy of Tony Blair. Official documents issued for example by the UN are used as further sources. Frequently, research papers conducted for needs of respective organisations are used, such as the House of Commons. A valid part of the information was also obtained from Tony Blair's memoirs. Last but not least, there are references made to variety of respected media corporations, such as the BBC. Due to the relative newness of the subject, the opinions on presented topics may differ from author to author.

The Origins of Blair's Foreign Policy

Tony Blair became the leader of the Labour Party in July 1994 after a sudden death of his predecessor John Smith in May and the following leadership elections. Tony Blair was the youngest party leader ever elected and probably the least traditional as well. This deviation from the traditional beliefs of the Labour Party is characterised in the desire to reform. The desire to change basically everything started with reviewing Clause IV of Labour Party constitution. Clause IV contained a very strong statement of traditional socialistic belief. This was not what characterised Labour Party anymore. In the battle to win the next General Election a new fresh start needed to be made. The party needed to come closer to middle-class British citizens; the citizens that had the real power to determine elections. From the desire to reform and change the refreshed and renewed Labour Party was born – New Labour.¹

The Parliament was dissolved on April 8th 1997 and the date for the general election was set on May 1st 1997.² In this General Election the Labour Party won by a landslide. After eighteen years of Conservative government a new fresh start was expected by almost everyone. This victory was not remarkable only for the big majority of seats won by the Labour Party, but also for what later appeared to be a start of a 'New Labour Decade'. Until 1997, the Labour Party had lost four elections in a row and had never won two consecutive full terms. For Tony Blair himself this was breaking new ground because he had never served in office before. Being a Prime Minister was his first and only occupation in

¹ HINMAN, Bonnie. *Tony Blair. Modern World Leaders*. New York: Chelsea House, 2007, p. 56-61.

² GAY, Oonagh – WHITE, Isobel. HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY. *Election timetables: Research paper 07/31*. London: Parliament and Constitution Centre, 2007, p. 12.

government.³ The Labour Party won the elections based on its manifesto New Labour, New Life for Britain. The manifesto focused mainly on five specific pledges – education, crime, health, jobs and economic stability.⁴

Tony Blair has applied a new style of premiership with its features. The fundamental change was concerning the working groups – he tended to work with circles of confidants and advisers, regarding cabinet and formal meetings as often unproductive. The other feature was spending less time in the House of Commons. The most visible change was reflected in taking more time to manage the media and appear live on television; which turned up to be crucial for all the public presentations, specifically those on the international stage.⁵

Tony Blair came to office with completely zero experience of foreign affairs. This statement is hard to believe nowadays. Probably it is due to the fact that almost all politicians have their election campaigns based on domestic issues. And as a consequence of globalised world, when the newly elected politicians come to the office, they simply need to be better informed about and more involved in what is happening abroad.⁶

Blair's zero experience at the beginning was illustrated also in the fact that during the General Election campaign Tony Blair gave only one single speech on foreign policy. He saw the foreign sector as the least important part of the manifesto. We may argue that it was due to his lack

³ BLAIR, Tony. *A Journey: My Political Life*. London: The Random House Group, 2010, p. 7.

⁴ LABOUR PARTY. *History of the Labour Party: New Labour*. Retrieved from: <http://www.labour.org.uk/historyofthelabourparty3>. 2012-03-31.

⁵ KAVANAGH, Dennis. The Blair premiership. In: SELDON, Anthony (ed.). *Blair's Britain 1997-2007*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 3-15.

⁶ KAVANAGH, Dennis. The Blair premiership. In: SELDON, Anthony (ed.). *Blair's Britain 1997-2007*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 3-15.

of knowledge. In 1995, a year after he took the lead of the Labour Party, Tony Blair engaged Jonathan Powell even more to work closely with him and his team.⁷

Before joining Tony Blair, Jonathan Powell had been a British diplomat for sixteen years, present for example at the Zimbabwe independence negotiations, the accession of Portugal to the European Union (EU) and the negotiations with China on the return of Hong Kong. He was the First Secretary at the British Embassy in Washington in 1991, when he followed the campaign trails of the main candidates. At that time it was George H. W. Bush running on behalf of the Republican Party and Bill Clinton for the Democratic Party. During this stay Powell became close to President Clinton and his staff whom he introduced to the leaders of New Labour.⁸

By the time it was almost clear that the Conservatives would not win the upcoming General Election, Tony Blair decided to improve on this very lack of knowledge. Jonathan Powell organised highly secret and discreet meetings to introduce the main problems of diplomacy and current international events to the future Prime Minister. To help to tackle those tasks and to share their views upon them, distinguished former diplomats and academics were invited to such meetings. For illustration, we can mention several permanent members of those meetings - Sir David Hannay, who served as former British ambassador to the United Nations and became a life peer in 2001;⁹ Timothy Garton Ash, who is a

⁷ KAMPFNER, John. *Blair's Wars*. London: Free Press, 2003, p. 4.

⁸ THE LONDON SPEAKER BUREAU. Economics & Political Speakers: Jonathan Powell. Retrieved from: http://www.londonspeakerbureau.in/jonathan_powell.aspx. 2012-03-31.

⁹ UK PARLIAMENT WEBSITE. Lords: The Lord Hannay of Chiswick GCMG. Retrieved from: <http://www.parliament.uk/biographies/lords/david-hannay/2167>. 2012-03-31.

well known historian and commentator concerned with the contemporary history of Europe;¹⁰ and as the last example – Sir Lawrence Freedman, who is a professor of War Studies at the King's College London. He is also known as a member of official inquiry into Iraq War nowadays.¹¹ Blair was really trying to educate himself. But on the other hand, he tried to make sure that foreign affairs would not come up as an issue during the campaign.¹²

One thing we can be sure of is that even though Tony Blair's knowledge base was insufficient, he always knew which people to take into the team to provide such knowledge. In this way he was a leader who picked his team and let it work without interruptive ideas. He offered political advisers, intellectuals and scholars the opportunity to engage in his team. For the most visible position - the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, he appointed Robin Cook.¹³

Robin Cook was a long time Member of Parliament representing Labour Party – he became MP in 1974. During the Conservative government he held various posts in the Official Opposition Shadow Cabinet. He was the opposition spokesman for the Treasury and economic affairs, the spokesman on Health and social security, the spokesman on Trade and industry. Apart from his minister duty, he

¹⁰ TIMOTHY GARTON ASH. *Biography*. Retrieved from: <http://www.timothygartonash.com/biography.html>. 2012-03-31.

¹¹ KING'S COLLEGE LONDON. *Professors. Professor Sir Lawrence Freedman*. Retrieved from: <http://www.kcl.ac.uk/sspp/departments/warstudies/people/professors/freedman.aspx>. 2012-03-31.

¹² KAMPFNER, John. *Blair's Wars*. London: Free Press, 2003, p. 10-11.

¹³ HILL, Christopher. Putting the world to rights: Tony Blair's foreign policy mission. In: SELDON, Anthony – KAVANGH, Dennis (eds.). *The Blair Effect 2001-2005: A Wasted Term?* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 385.

became the Leader of the House of Commons in 2001. He resigned from all his positions in 2003. This issue will be discussed later in the thesis.¹⁴

It is customary that Cabinets and governments have frequent meetings to discuss current situation, measures to be taken and further steps. Such meetings were held also by Blair's Cabinet. But at the beginning of the New Labour government little attention was paid to foreign issues. Neither Jonathan Powell, nor Robin Cook could have expressed their views on the international stage. As was mentioned above, Tony Blair had very good instincts on people he worked with. It makes more sense when we look deeper into the foreign policy making in Britain of that time. With the Cabinet not really interested in international affairs, the Foreign Secretary Robin Cook had it quite easy to push his ideas about foreign policy through the Cabinet. However, the ideas were not always the best ones and controversy was a frequently used word to address Robin Cook.¹⁵

The first public expression, in which Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) shared the view on foreign policy was made on May 12th 1997. Robin Cook presented the mission statement. In his speech, the Foreign Secretary set a new agenda focusing on four main targets – security, prosperity, quality of life and mutual respect. The aim was also to keep the UK as the key player in international relations.¹⁶ What is most remembered from the mission statement is the stress Robin Cook put on 'ethical dimension of foreign policy'. He stated that '*...our foreign policy must have an ethical dimension and must support the demands of other*

¹⁴ A&E TELEVISION NETWORK. *Biography. Robin Cook*. 2012. Retrieved from: <http://www.biography.com/people/robin-cook-9255974>. 2012-03-31.

¹⁵ KAMPFNER, John. *Blair's Wars*. London: Free Press, 2003, p. 14.

¹⁶ DICKIE, John. *The New Mandarins: How British Foreign Policy Works*. London: I.B.Tauris, 2004, p. 83.

*peoples for the democratic rights on which we insist for ourselves. The Labour Government will put human rights at the heart of our foreign policy...*¹⁷

The statement of FCO was not exactly what the Prime Minister had expected. Cook's opinion that arms should not be sold to regimes that are planning any kind of aggression using them was strongly projected in the statement. The speech was meant to aim at the ongoing Indonesia-East Timor dispute. The tricky part was that since the times of the Conservative government, the UK had become the biggest arm supplier to Indonesia and its dictatorship led by President Suharto. And Tony Blair was not really willing to change it any little, at least in the beginning. This was mainly because it is never a good idea to make the lobbyists angry, especially not the ones from the arms industry.¹⁸

How much Tony Blair was unhappy with Robin Cook's steps was shown only few months later. On November 11th 1997 he gave his first major speech on foreign policy at the Mansion House. That was the time for him to express his priorities, not Cook's.¹⁹

One of the goals was to put Britain at the heart of the EU, including British entry to the single currency. The EU was waiting excitingly for the change of government in Britain. At the time of Conservative government

¹⁷ THE GUARDIAN. *Robin Cook's speech on the government's ethical foreign policy: The speech by Robin Cook that started it all*. 1997-05-12. Retrieved from: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/1997/may/12/indonesia.ethicalforeignpolicy/print>. 2012-03-31.

¹⁸ THE GUARDIAN. *The International Arms Trade to Indonesia*. 1999-09-09. Retrieved from: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/1997/may/12/indonesia.ethicalforeignpolicy/print>. 2012-03-31.

¹⁹ LUNN, Jon – MILLER, Vaughne – SMITH, Ben. HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY. *British foreign policy since 1997: Research Paper 08/56*. London: International Affairs and Defence Section, 2008, p. 20.

Britain was characterised as a partner hard to deal with within the EU. It was very unlikely that the newly selected Labour government would continue the Conservative policy towards Europe. New Labour did not perceive the process of European integration as an obstacle, but rather as an instrument helping to achieve further goals.²⁰

There was also the case of the phenomenon of the 'Special Relationship' between the United States of America (US) and the UK. It was first mentioned by Winston Churchill towards Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1941 and it has represented strong transatlantic cooperation ever since.²¹ For every British Prime Minister it has meant a different thing. The 'Special Relationship' could be based on common ideology or personal relationship. In the early years of Blair's premiership, it was both for him. Bill Clinton was the president of the US between 1993 and 2001.²² As a member of the Democratic Party, he was supposed to be close to Blair ideologically. Blair was astonished not only by Clinton's centre-left politics, but also by his personality. The two statesmen had met several times before the Labour victory in 1997. The first official visit of President Clinton took place on May 29th 1997. That was a considerably early visit for the diplomatic procedure. It was seen as a keen gesture towards reinstating of the relations after the reserved relations during Major's Conservative government.²³

²⁰ VÁŠKA, Jan. *Kontinuity a diskontinuity evropské politiky New Labour*. Praha: Fakulta sociálních věd Univerzity Karlovy, 2009, p. 4-5.

²¹ DICKIE, John. *The New Mandarins: How British Foreign Policy Works*. London: I.B.Tauris, 2004, p. 2.

²² THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. *Presidents: 42. Bill Clinton*. Retrieved from: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/williamjclinton>. 2012-03-31.

²³ KAMPFNER, John. *Blair's Wars*. London: Free Press, 2003, p. 9-13.

From the previous two goals we can derive that the goal to act as a bridge between Europe and the US was very hard to reach. Timothy Garton Ash describes this as the Janus Britain, after the Roman two-faced god Janus. He claims that Britain is trying to have not two, but four faces – island, world, Europe and America. He sees a valid point in the fact that both Europe and America are signs of western modernity. This is also represented in Britain's membership in the European Union on one side, and membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) on the other.²⁴ What Blair also stressed out was that Britain should become a proactive country that should use its western democratic values and promote them internationally.²⁵

²⁴ ASH, Timothy Garton. *Free World: Why a Crisis of the West Reveals the Opportunity of Our Time*. London: Penguin Books, 2005, p. 16-53.

²⁵ CLARKE, Michael. Foreign Policy. In: SELDON, Anthony (ed.). *Blair's Britain 1997-2007*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 600.

Iraq I

The first situation that questioned the statements of proclaimed new foreign policy of the UK conducted by the Labour government was the bombing of Iraq in late 1998. This armed conflict was the first one out of five that Britain was engaged in under the Labour government.

The dispute in Iraq had been going on since the liberation of Kuwait in 1991. The UN Security Council had passed several resolutions concerning the Iraq-Kuwait dispute. In Resolution 678 the Security Council authorised acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the UN. Thus, it allowed the use of all necessary means to maintain peace.²⁶

The UN gave Iraq the deadline until January 15th 1991 to withdraw its forces out of Kuwait. Saddam Hussein ignored the deadline, so the international community has launched the operation Desert Storm. The operation was led by the US and it had support of twenty-nine countries which was large number at that time. And it was a huge success of the US and its allies. The operation was quick and effective from its beginning. It started on January 17th 1991 and finished on February 28th 1991 when Iraq accepted the ceasefire. The UK sent the largest contingent of all the US allies to Iraq. The Labour Party, as the opposition, was formally backing the operation.²⁷

Almost immediately after Iraq accepted the ceasefire, uprisings began to spread from dissident areas in the north and south of Iraq. The rebellions were launched by the suppressed minorities of Kurds and Shi'a Muslims. The uprisings were doomed to brutal crackdown partly because

²⁶ UNITED NATIONS. *Security Council Resolutions - 1990: Resolution 678: Iraq-Kuwait (29 November)*. 1990-11-29. Retrieved from: <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1990/scres90.htm>. 2012-04-08.

²⁷ KAMPFNER, John. *Blair's Wars*. London: Free Press, 2003, p. 19-21.

of the unfulfilled promises of the allies. After the ceasefire the UN also required all the weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles to be handed in. Hussein's regime never really fulfilled this demand, thus Iraq became the subject of weapons inspection programme. Also no-fly zones were established over Iraq to protect the minorities that started the rebellions from brutal actions of Hussein's forces.²⁸

The problem with the no-fly zones was that they were not authorised by the UN, unlike the military campaign to get Iraqi forces out of Kuwait. The UN Security Council imposed several sets of sanctions on Iraq during the 1990's but never authorised the no-fly zones specifically. The allies claimed that their actions were in accordance of the Resolution 688 adopted on April 5th 1991. But this resolution did not authorise acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It did not mention that all necessary means could be used. The allies argued that the no-fly zones were more than necessary to protect the civilians.²⁹

This was quite a game-changing position of the allies. At the beginning of the new world order after the Cold War it brought a new question of sovereignty to the international relations. In 1990's the debate over the meaning of the term sovereignty started. As the situation on the international stage evolved, it became clearer that a change had been in process. It became more evident that the sovereignty of a state can be disrupted in order to protect human rights of civilians. And that is what the allies operated with.

²⁸ BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION. *Mid-East. Iraq Profile*. 2001-01-10. Retrieved from: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14546763>. 2012-04-08.

²⁹ BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION. *Middle East. No-fly zones: The Legal Position*. 2001-02-19. Retrieved from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1175950.stm. 2012-04-08.

As was mentioned above, the United Nations imposed several sets of sanctions on Hussein's Iraq during the 1990s. In the history of the United Nations it was the most complex set of sanctions ever imposed on a state. The main impact of the sanctions was that they affected import and export of all commodities and products, namely oil and military equipment. Those sanctions were reviewed every six months. But they did not have the demanded effect and the situation of civilians was not getting better.³⁰

Thus in 1995 the UN gave a green light to partial resumption of oil for Iraq. This was not the first attempt to launch such action but the previous attempts were declined by the Iraqi government. On April 14th 1995 the Security Council adopted Resolution 986 establishing the so-called oil-for-food programme.³¹ The programme was providing the possibility to sell Iraqi oil and hereby cover the purchase of humanitarian goods in order to meet the humanitarian needs of civilians. From its announcement in 1995 it took another year to actually launch the programme. The delay was caused by difficulties that occurred during negotiations of details between the Iraqi government and the United Nations. The programme was directed mainly on the food sector, health sector, transportation and agriculture.³²

³⁰ DODD, Tom – YOUNGS, Tim. HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY. *The Iraq Crisis: Research Paper 98/28*. London: International Affairs and Defence Section, 1998, p. 7.

³¹ UNITED NATIONS. *Security Council Resolution 986 (1995) on authorization to permit the import of petroleum and petroleum products originating in Iraq, as a temporary measure to provide for humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people*. 1995-04-14. Retrieved from: <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N95/109/88/PDF/N9510988.pdf?OpenElement>. 2012-04-08.

³² UNITED NATIONS. *Office of the Iraq Programme: Oil-for-Food*. Retrieved from: <http://www.un.org/depts/oip/background/index.html>. 2012-04-08.

The situation in Iraq hit another bump in September 1996. Hussein's forces performed attacks towards the minority of Kurds in the north of the country. The US and the UK answered with air strikes and the extension of the no-fly zone in the northern part of the country. That was the last major military action performed by Britain under the Conservative government.³³

Simultaneously, with the change of the government of the UK the rhetoric of some of the allies started to change. Some of the states wanted to start the process of getting things back to normal in Iraq, especially those concerning the trade. This process had to be followed by lifting of the sanctions. The US and the UK were strictly opposing such intentions. The reason the two powers gave was that the regime in Iraq could not be trusted in the question of weapons of mass destruction.³⁴

The unwillingness to allow complete investigation of any kind of programme to develop chemical, biological, nuclear and ballistic weapons on the territory of Iraq was the main issue causing the non-decreasing level of anger from the allies towards Iraq. To maintain the control over such programmes, the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) was established on April 3rd 1991, by the adoption of Resolution 687. The commission consisted of experts on weapons. Except from investigation and inspections, the commission was authorised to destroy, remove or render harmless all items specified in the resolution 687.³⁵

³³ KAMPFNER, John. *Blair's Wars*. London: Free Press, 2003, p. 19-21.

³⁴ DODD, Tom – YOUNGS, Tim. HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY. *The Iraq Crisis: Research Paper 98/28*. London: International Affairs and Defence Section, 1998, p. 7-9.

³⁵ UNITED NATIONS. *Security Council Resolutions – 1991: Resolution 687: Iraq-Kuwait (3 Apr)*. 1991-04-03. Retrieved from: <http://daccess-dds->

According to the commission reports it destroyed quite a number of different kinds of weapons. However, the Iraqi government was not fully cooperating with UNSCOM. The commission had to face denial or restrictions of access to conduct the investigation of suspicious materials. Thus the full extent of weapon programmes in Iraq remained uncertain.³⁶

The attitude of Iraq towards warnings from the United Nations or the allies started to be indigestible at the end of 1997. On January 31st 1998 Robin Cook and his US opposite number, Madeleine Albright, announced at a joint press conference that compliance with Iraq was vital for the stability in the region. Unless such behaviour was to be seen from Iraqi side, military action could be a possible result of such non-compliance.³⁷

The diplomatic solution of the dispute was, however, the desirable result of the situation. In the middle of February 1998, Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General, went to see Saddam Hussein in Iraq. His mission there was simple: To communicate to Hussein that this was his last chance to obey the United Nations demands. If not, this failure would lead to military action. Hussein assured Annan that the situation will improve. But Hussein's words once again proved to be empty.³⁸

Although the cooperation between Iraq and UNSCOM was working for a while, in October Hussein broke the agreement again. The US and

ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/596/23/IMG/NR059623.pdf?OpenElement.
2012-04-08.

³⁶ UNITED NATIONS. *Chronology of Main Events: UNSCOM*. 1991-12-17. Retrieved from: <http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/Chronology/chronology.htm>. 2012-04-08.

³⁷ DODD, Tom – YOUNGS, Tim. HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY. *The Iraq Crisis: Research Paper 98/28*. London: International Affairs and Defence Section, 1998, p. 15-17.

³⁸ KAMPFNER, John. *Blair's Wars*. London: Free Press, 2003, p. 26-29.

the UK were realising that some form of military action had to be carried out. For Blair it was about to be the first military action as the Prime Minister. In this situation he had to be careful with jumping to conclusions. He was afraid of the reaction of the public and even more of the reaction of the Labour Party members. Concerning the international community, the US and the UK stood alone on the side of armed action. Neither the allies such as France, nor the Security Council were willing to authorise such actions.³⁹

The attack was planned on November 15th 1998. The Secretary General has sent a personal letter stating the situation to Hussein. A few hours before the planned action a response arrived from Hussein agreeing to greater compliance. The planned strikes had to be stopped to give Hussein a chance to prove him right. Once again they were only empty promises.⁴⁰

The final decision to launch attacks was made. The only question was when. The holy month of Ramadan was about to start on December 20th 1998. During this month any armed action was inconceivable. The operation Desert Fox was due to be executed between December 16th and December 19th 1998. As the targets, places where Iraq refused to cooperate with UNSCOM were chosen. By the time of the attacks it was only Britain and the US to take part in the bombing of Baghdad.⁴¹

The aims of the conducted bombing were: *'To degrade Saddam Hussein's ability to make and to use weapons of mass destruction. To*

³⁹ YOUNGS, Tim – OAKES, Mark. HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY. *Iraq: „Desert Fox“ and Policy Developments: Research Paper 99/13*. London: International Affairs and Defence Section, 1999, p. 7-9.

⁴⁰ KAMPFNER, John. *Blair's Wars*. London: Free Press, 2003, p. 29-31.

⁴¹ KAMPFNER, John. *Blair's Wars*. London: Free Press, 2003, p. 31-33.

*diminish Saddam Hussein's ability to wage war against his neighbours. To demonstrate to Saddam Hussein the consequences of violating international obligations.*⁴² Both the US and the UK claimed that the main aim was not to destabilise the regime. Critics argue that this was exactly the aim, pointing out that nearly half of the targets were governmentally connected.⁴³ It is questionable whether those goals were fulfilled. Iraq was contained, but only for a little while. If the operation had really been successful, the powers would not have felt the need to come back to Iraq five years later.

What had Tony Blair learnt from this first encounter with a military action? Certainly his self-esteem as a world leader had grown very much. Within a year, from a man with zero knowledge of foreign policy he had become a key world leading player. Not bad one wants to say. The situation in Iraq was a valuable lesson for Tony Blair. It should have prepared him for the four wars that were still about to come. We also learnt that Tony Blair was not afraid to push his policy through. Even though, the consequence of those actions could mean an armed conflict. By the intervention in Iraq Blair actually did accomplish what he had stated in his vision of the foreign policy - Britain became a proactive country and the 'Special Relationship' of the UK and the US got a new dimension.

⁴² U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. *Operation Desert Fox: Overview*. Retrieved from: http://www.defense.gov/specials/desert_fox/. 2012-04-08.

⁴³ YOUNGS, Tim – OAKES, Mark. HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY. *Iraq: „Desert Fox“ and Policy Developments: Research Paper 99/13*. London: International Affairs and Defence Section, 1999, p. 30-31.

Kosovo

After the controversial and much discussed intervention in Iraq, Tony Blair became more engaged in world politics than in the previous years. He was now in the spotlight not only at home in Britain, but he became a person of public interest of the whole world. And the event that was about to strengthen this was to come in a few months.

In the Balkans the situation was always tense. We can recall the events that preceded the World War I. During the Cold War the situation was relatively stable. The territory of Socialist Republic of Serbia included two extensively autonomous provinces - Vojvodina and Kosovo. The province of Kosovo was inhabited mainly by Muslim ethnic-Albanians. The Eastern Orthodox Serbs, however, saw Kosovo as the historic cradle of the Serbian nation. Thus, the dispute over Kosovo does not stay on strategic or economic background. It is based rather on historical, religious and emotional indicators. Those factors were even more deepened and politicised during the last centuries, with the raise of nationalism.⁴⁴

The Cold War had contained the disputes from bursting in many regions in the world. The situation in Kosovo was not any different. Relative stability was shattered by the death of Josip Tito in 1980. The tensions started to grow. The final strike against peace in the region was the Serbian presidential elections in 1989 and the victory of the leader of the Serbian communist party Slobodan Milosevic. He declared openly that the autonomy should be taken away from Kosovo and the Serbs should reinstate their dominance in the province. In 1990 a new Serbian

⁴⁴ YOUNGS, Tim – DODD, Tom. HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY. *Kosovo: Research Paper 98/73*. London: International Affairs and Defence Section, 1998, p. 6-9 .

constitution was adopted and Kosovo and Vojvodina became regions within Serbia. The rights of ethnic-Albanians were suppressed. Following the declaration of independence by Croatia and Slovenia in 1991, the Kosovar Albanian parliament voted in favour of the independence of Kosovo in October 1991. Kosovo even appealed for recognition to the European Community in December 1991, but was rejected.⁴⁵

Despite the wars going on across the borders in Croatia and Bosnia, the situation remained relatively calm until the end of the year 1995. The possible ticking bomb of Kosovo was a well known issue of international affairs. The conflict started to escalate in early 1996. An event that was seen as a backstabbing act in Kosovo was the recognition of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) as a sovereign independent state in April 1996. The newly recognised country consisted of Montenegro and Serbia. Beginning with 1996, the attacks between ethnic-Albanians and Serbs intensified and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) started to appear publicly. The KLA conducted sporadic attacks against Serbian police and state officials as a response to continued suppression by the central government. In early 1998 Serbian authorities executed a series of massacres in villages in Kosovo.⁴⁶ As a response, the UN Security council has adopted Resolution 1160 stating that the UN are condemning Serbian actions towards Kosovar Albanians. The

⁴⁵ YOUNGS, Tim – DODD, Tom. HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY. *Kosovo: Research Paper 98/73*. London: International Affairs and Defence Section, 1998, p. 10-13 .

⁴⁶ YOUNGS, Tim – DODD, Tom. HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY. *Kosovo: Research Paper 98/73*. London: International Affairs and Defence Section, 1998, p. 13-18 .

resolution has also established a '*comprehensive arms embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia*'.⁴⁷

As the conflict continued to grow in Kosovo, also the situation on the international stage was getting hotter. The Contact Group that was originally created for the conflict in Bosnia in 1995 turned its attention towards Kosovo. The group consisted of the US, the UK, France, Germany, Italy and the Russian Federation. The Contact Group openly called the KLA a terrorist organisation, but at the same time did not approve actions of Milosevic's regime.⁴⁸

Compared to the situation in Iraq and the response of the international community, Kosovo was a completely different case. It shared some similarities with Iraq – the governing regime was suppressing the minority and it had been an ongoing dispute. But the differences are the most important in this case. The dispute over Kosovo was classified as an internal dispute. The FRY was a recognised and sovereign state. Kosovo was a part of the republic in the international point of view and the governing regime was using excessive power against the inhabitants of Kosovo. But was this a matter for the international community to solve? And most importantly, the FRY was not representing an international threat, unlike Iraq. The FRY has never declared any intension to use its powers against any other sovereign state. As it was already mentioned, the conflict was not based on

⁴⁷ UNITED NATIONS. *Security Council Resolution 1160 (1998) on the letters from the United Kingdom (S/1998/223) and the United States (S/1998/272)*. 1998-03-31. Retrieved from: <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/090/23/PDF/N9809023.pdf?OpenElement>. 2012-04-11.

⁴⁸ DEPARTMENT OF STATE OF THE USA. *Kosovo Chronology*. 1999-05-21. Retrieved from: http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/fs_kosovo_timeline.html. 2012-04-11.

strategic grounds, but rather historical. Thus the international powers hesitated to take any military actions towards the Serbs. They simply could not find the right argument to justify such action. What they did was trying to solve it with diplomacy, not with force.

From the beginning, the Russian representatives declared that they would not support any resolution in the UN Security Council that would give a mandate for a military action. In autumn 1998, after series of bloody cruelty took place, the Russian representatives changed their rhetoric a bit. They hinted that they still would not vote in favour of this operation, but militarily they would not stay in the way. That was a game-changer. That was the statement that NATO was waiting for. The justification and authorisation was granted. Particularly the British FCO lawyers were concerned about the legal implications of such actions, keeping in mind the problems that were occurring in Iraq's case.⁴⁹

In 1998 there was still the bitter question whether it is necessary to have an organisation such as NATO after the end of the Cold War. The Americans were aware that it was always them who risk their lives, not their European partners. Tony Blair was as well keen on the Americans risking lives for the Europeans. And he wanted to show the US that Europe can do more. It was according to his statement – Britain should maintain the bridge between the US and Europe. Kosovo should have been the case of proving it.

In the light of the worsening situation, NATO increased the pressure on Milosevic's regime. At the same time, diplomatic solutions were trying to be made with the help of the US Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke. In October 1998 NATO authorised the air strikes against the

⁴⁹ KAMPFNER, John. *Blair's Wars*. London: Free Press, 2003, p. 40-41.

FRY but Milosevic decided to obtain the demands of the international community.⁵⁰ The UN Security Council adopted the Resolution 1203 on October 24th 1998 approving the agreement reached but not giving NATO the explicit mandate for a military action.⁵¹

In early 1999 the international community lost its patience with the ongoing massacres. In February there was one last attempt to maintain peace. It was the UK and France who chaired the meetings between the Serbs and the Albanians. Despite the deadline to reach the agreement several times, the outcome of those meetings was virtually zero. The alliance was getting ready to act. NATO claimed that humanitarian necessity constituted sufficient basis for a military action. The plan was to conduct similar action as in the case of Iraq.⁵²

On March 24th 1999 the operation Allied Force was launched. NATO executed air strikes against the military forces of the FRY. NATO has communicated specific conditions that FRY had to meet to stop the air strikes. The demands were following: *'... a verifiable end to all Serb military actions and the immediate end of violence and repression; the withdrawal of all Milosevic's military police and paramilitary forces; the stationing in Kosovo of an international military force; the unconditional and safe return of refugees and internally-displaced persons; unhindered access for the humanitarian relief organisations; and finally, the credible*

⁵⁰ YOUNGS, Tim. HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY. *Kosovo: The Diplomatic and Military Options: Research Paper 98/93*. London: International Affairs and Defence Section, 1998, p. 7-20.

⁵¹ UNITED NATIONS. *Security Council Resolution 1203 (1998) on the situation in Kosovo*. 1998-10-24. Retrieved from: <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/321/21/PDF/N9832121.pdf?OpenElement>. 2012-04-11.

⁵² YOUNGS, Tim – OAKES, Mark – BOWERS, Paul. HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY. *Kosovo: NATO and Military Action: Research Paper 99/34*. London: International Affairs and Defence Section, 1999, p. 7-20.

*assurance of a willingness to work towards a political framework based on the Rambouillet Agreement.*⁵³

The first reaction to the strikes from the international community was disconcerted. Within the UN Security Council, Russia and China were strictly against. Russia even prepared a resolution demanding to stop the strikes but it was not adopted in the end. Russia froze relations with NATO and called for armed assistance to help the FRY. The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan showed regret that diplomacy had failed. He also stated that sometimes force needs to be used to maintain peace. That was what NATO was invoking to.⁵⁴

The original assumption was that the strikes will last similar amount of time as the strikes against Iraq. The alliance was counting on the fact that the strikes would teach the FRY a lesson. And another round of negotiation would be possible afterwards. But the FRY armed forces only intensified their actions towards ethnic-Albanians. Milosevic's regime was executing their idea of ethnic cleansing. NATO forces were conducting strictly air strikes. Neither President Clinton, nor Prime Minister Blair was eager to sent troops of soldiers directly to Kosovo to fight the Serbs. The allies did not want to fight war of anybody else. But in the light of the horrors Tony Blair decided he would send British troops to Kosovo. Blair needed support from the US on this. President Clinton remained unyielding. He did not want to risk American lives on the field.⁵⁵

⁵³ NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION. *Press Conference by the Head of the UNHCR, Mrs Ogata and Secretary General Javier Solana*. 1999-04-14. Retrieved from: <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1999/s990414b.htm>. 2012-04-11.

⁵⁴ YOUNGS, Tim – OAKES, Mark – BOWERS, Paul. HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY. *Kosovo: Operation 'Allied Force': Research Paper 99/48*. London: International Affairs and Defence Section, 1999, p. 10-11.

⁵⁵ KAMPFNER, John. *Blair's Wars*. London: Free Press, 2003, p. 44-54.

Blair took the responsibility for the ground attacks on his own back. He was lobbying for support everywhere he could. Blair flew to the US in April 1999. And there, in Chicago, on April 22 he gave one of his major speeches. In Chicago he formulated his ideas in the doctrine of the international community. He expressed the idea of mutual dependence. In his eyes the states are all part of the international community and could not ignore when violation of human rights is happening somewhere, even though it is an inner conflict. In a case like this the international community should proceed with liberal interventionism. This principally meant that in cases of crimes against humanity, intervention is a positive legitimate moral obligation of the international community.⁵⁶ However, this humanitarian intervention should be guided by answers to the questions that Tony Blair specified as: '*Are we sure of our case? Have we exhausted all diplomatic options? Are there military operations we can sensibly and prudently undertake? Are we prepared for the long-term? Do we have national interests involved?*'⁵⁷

To support his agenda, Tony Blair and his wife went to see a refugee camp in May. After he saw the situation on his own, the horrible condition of the refugees, he was determined more than ever that Milosevic's regime needed to be taken down for good. The idea that Blair had was that if diplomacy was needed to work, it had to be supported by force. Simultaneously with his personal campaign of victory of the good, negotiations with FRY were held. But they were held without the British presence. It was Russian, American and EU diplomats who were present

⁵⁶ LUNN, Jon – MILLER, Vaughne – SMITH, Ben. HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY. *British foreign policy since 1997: Research Paper 08/56*. London: International Affairs and Defence Section, 2008, p. 9-10.

⁵⁷ KAMPFNER, John. *Blair's Wars*. London: Free Press, 2003, p. 52.

at the meetings. The Serbs agreed to withdraw from Kosovo on June 9th 1999. The air strikes conducted by NATO stopped the following day. Instead of few days, the operation lasted seventy-eight days.⁵⁸

Concerning the military point of view, the operation 'Allied Force' was a huge success. Only two NATO pilots were lost in the battle. A lot of the FRY military equipment was destroyed. From the humanitarian point of view, the operation caused a huge humanitarian crisis in the region. Hundreds of thousands ethnic-Albanians were turned into refugees due to ethnic cleansings. The return of the refugees was the most important part of the post-conflict resolution carried out by the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) mission. KFOR peacekeeping troops were deployed in Kosovo in June 1999.⁵⁹

For Tony Blair personally, the Kosovo experience meant a key factor in his view of international order. He took personally the scenes he saw in Kosovo and felt that they could have been prevented. The proclaimed doctrine of international community provided a framework for the future. With the different opinions in the UN Security Council there was a need for arguments how to justify military actions without the specific mandate from the UN. Tony Blair saw the concept of humanitarian interventions as the right reason how to justify those actions. Since Kosovo, Blair did believe that the use of force is a legitimate measure taken to solve disputes in the name of protecting human rights.

⁵⁸ KAMPFNER, John. *Blair's Wars*. London: Free Press, 2003, p. 50-57.

⁵⁹ YOUNGS, Tim – BOWERS, Paul. HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY. *Kosovo: KFOR and Reconstruction: Research Paper 99/66*. London: International Affairs and Defence Section, 1999, p. 8-15.

Sierra Leone

Another humanitarian intervention Tony Blair dragged Britain into was the dispute in Sierra Leone. The dispute was based mainly on the control of the diamond business. The conflict in Sierra Leone started in March 1991, when members of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) led by Foday Sankoh started armed fighting in eastern part of the country. This had to lead to the fall of that time government. That time legitimate government fought against the rebels with the help of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). But the following year, on April 29th 1992, Captain Strasser ousted President Joseph Momoh in a military coup.⁶⁰ Even though there was a change of the government, the RUF armed forces continued the fighting. In February 1995 the United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali appointed a Special Envoy Berhamu Dinka from Ethiopia. The Envoy collaborated closely with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and ECOWAS in order to negotiate peace and bring the legislative framework back to the country.⁶¹

One of the tasks was also to organise parliamentary and presidential elections. The elections were held in February 1996 and resulted in the victory of Sierra Leone People's Party led by Ahmed Tejan Kabbah. Those elections were funded mainly by the UK. The problem was that members of the RUF were not participating in the elections; therefore they did not recognise the elections and the results. The Special

⁶⁰ IDNES.CZ. *Krev vojáků OSN stupňuje napětí v Sierra Leone*. 2000-05-04. Retrieved from: http://zpravy.idnes.cz/krev-vojaku-osn-stupnuje-napeti-v-sierra-leone-fl3-/zahranicni.aspx?c=A000504111740zahranicni_mhk. 2012-04-13.

⁶¹ UNITED NATIONS. *Sierra Leone – UNAMSIL – Background*. Retrieved from: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamsil/background.html>. 2012-04-13.

Envoy helped to negotiate the Abidjan Peace Agreement. Despite the negotiations, the agreement failed. The RUF united with the military junta and performed another coup in May 1997. President Kabbah and the government were forced to leave for exile in Guinea. Without the help of Western countries Sierra Leone had to rely on the regional power of Nigeria. It was not the best solution to choose. Nigeria itself was sanctioned for violation of human rights. Tony Blair was in favour of restoring the legitimate President Kabbah in power. He trusted Robin Cook to be able to handle this situation as a Foreign Secretary.⁶²

Meanwhile, tensions between the two sides were increasing. On October 8th 1997 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1132. This resolution introduced oil and arms embargo on Sierra Leone. The resolution also authorised the deployment of ECOMOG troops to help maintain the embargo.⁶³ The embargo was imposed on both the RUF and the legitimate government. But the FCO of Britain was secretly violating the embargo by supporting the legitimate government in its attempts to return to power. Tony Blair was close to be furious when he learned this. His opinion on the situation was that even though mistakes had been made it was in the name of the legal government. It was the classical example of conducting the ethical policy for Tony Blair.⁶⁴

In February 1998 ECOMOG has launched a response attack against the junta. As the result of the successful attack the junta was

⁶² KAMPFNER, John. *Blair's Wars*. London: Free Press, 2003, p. 65-66.

⁶³ UNITED NATIONS. *Security Council Resolution 1132 (1997) The situation in Sierra Leone*. 1997-10-08. Retrieved from: <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N97/267/13/PDF/N9726713.pdf?OpenElement>. 2012-04-13.

⁶⁴ KAMPFNER, John. *Blair's Wars*. London: Free Press, 2003, p. 68-69.

removed from the capital, Freetown, and President Kabbah was returned to office on March 10th 1998.⁶⁵

Foday Sankoh was captured and sentenced to death by the court in Sierra Leone. Among the Africans war criminals he had one of the worst reputations for violations of human rights. Robin Cook has interceded for amnesty on Sankoh's behalf. He even took part in persuading President Kabbah to appoint Sankoh as the Minister for Natural Resources in July 1999. That was the result of the peace accord signed in Lome, Togo. The appointment practically made Sankoh in charge of the diamond mines. It was not surprising that very soon Sankoh returned to his previous behaviour.⁶⁶

On October 22nd 1999 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1270 authorising the establishment of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). UNAMSIL was the biggest peacekeeping mission conducted by the UN at that time.⁶⁷ However, the troops were consisting of Western soldiers. The mission did not receive enough sources; and members of the mission did not have much experience with such operations. With the increasing violence in Sierra Leone, the mission was not able to manage the situation.⁶⁸

⁶⁵ UNITED NATIONS. *Sierra Leone – UNAMSIL – Background*. Retrieved from: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamsil/background.html>. 2012-04-13.

⁶⁶ HARRIS, Robin. Blair's "Ethical" Policy. *The National Interest*. 2001, Spring 2001, p. 25-36.

⁶⁷ UNITED NATIONS. *Security Council Resolution 1270 (1999) on the situation in Sierra Leone*. 1999-10-22. Retrieved from: <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/315/02/PDF/N9931502.pdf?OpenElement>. 2012-04-13.

⁶⁸ KAMPFNER, John. *Blair's Wars*. London: Free Press, 2003, p. 68-74.

Thus in on February 7th 2000 the mission was extended by the adoption of Resolution 1289. The resolution added new tasks for the mission: *'To provide security at key locations and Government buildings, in particular in Freetown, important intersections and major airports. To facilitate the free flow of people, goods and humanitarian assistance along specified thoroughfares. To provide security in and at all sites of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme. To coordinate with and assist, the Sierra Leone law enforcement authorities in the discharge of their responsibilities. To guard weapons, ammunition and other military equipment collected from ex-combatants and to assists in their subsequent disposal or destruction.'*⁶⁹ The important news for the mission was that the UN Security Council gave UNAMSIL the mandate to take any necessary actions to meet those tasks. This meant that the mission could act under Chapter VII of the Charter of the UN.⁷⁰

The toughest moment came in May 2000 when almost 500 UN soldiers were taken hostage by the RUF. The Ministry of Defence and the FCO persuaded Blair to send British troops to Sierra Leone. The tasks for the British troops were to maintain security at the airport until the UN reinforcements arrive and to help release hostages. After the UN hostages were released, British troops helped Kabbah's army push the rebels out of the capital city.⁷¹

⁶⁹ UNITED NATIONS. *Security Council Resolution 1289 (2000) on the situation in Sierra Leone*. 2000-02-07. Retrieved from: <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/283/50/PDF/N0028350.pdf?OpenElement>. 2012-04-13.

⁷⁰ UNITED NATIONS. *Sierra Leone – UNAMSIL – Mandate*. Retrieved from: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamsil/mandate.html>. 2012-04-13.

⁷¹ BLAIR, Tony. *A Journey: My Political Life*. London: The Random House Group, 2010, p. 139-140.

Public opinion of the involvement of Britain in the conflict was poor. Why should British soldiers risk their lives in a far away African country? It was never publicly revealed but politicians saw it as a heritage from the colonial era they need to deal with delicately. The official statement of the UK government was that British troops will stay in Sierra Leone only until the UNAMSIL reinforcements arrive. But in reality the UK mission has a long-term goal of establishing democratic order.⁷²

The unravelling situation in Sierra Leone did not help to improve the public opinion in Britain. On August 25th 2000 eleven British soldiers were kidnapped. Britain immediately launched a search operation called Operation Barras. In five days the armed forces West Side Boys agreed to exchange five soldiers for medical supplies and a satellite phone. The operation British troops found the camp of the rebels and tried to free the rest of the hostages. During the fights there was one casualty on the British side and almost thirty rebels were killed on the other side.⁷³

The last enlargement of the mission was approved on March 30th 2001 by the adoption of Resolution 1346 by the UN Security Council. The main tasks of the mission prevailed and several new were added. UNAMSIL was ordered to assist the legitimate government of Sierra Leone. The primary goals were to help establish law and order, stabilise the situation in the country and guide it to independent elections.⁷⁴ UNAMSIL was ended by December 31st 2005. British troops withdrew

⁷² HARRIS, Robin. Blair's "Ethical" Policy. *The National Interest*. 2001, Spring 2001, p. 25-36.

⁷³ BLAIR, Tony. *A Journey: My Political Life*. London: The Random House Group, 2010, p. 162-163.

⁷⁴ UNITED NATIONS. *Security Council Resolution 1346 (2001) on the situation in Sierra Leone*. 2001-03-30. Retrieved from: <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/312/19/PDF/N0131219.pdf?OpenElement>. 2012-04-13.

from Sierra Leone in July 2002 when the official end of the war was declared.⁷⁵

Unlike other missions Britain was dragged into under Blair's premiership, Sierra Leone caused much less controversy. The mission was supported by several UN resolutions. And in the international community there was a wide consensus that this had to be done. The assessment of the mission by the international community was even better than expected. According to the UN statement, UNAMSIL can serve as an example of successful peacekeeping of new generation with the emphasis on peacebuilding. The whole mission including British troops helped with disarmament of thousands of rebels and helped with restoring governmental structures. The outcome of the mission was not only relatively successful stabilisation of the country but also the establishment of special tribunals dealing with war crimes.⁷⁶

Tony Blair himself proclaimed that the action in Sierra Leone was the military action he was the most proud of from all.⁷⁷ It is no wonder that he says so, considering the controversy that all the other actions caused. In the case of Sierra Leone Tony Blair applied all the principles of his doctrine of international community and the ethical policy proclaimed by Foreign Secretary Robin Cook. This military action can be truly excused by the need to protect the human rights that were seriously violated.

⁷⁵ BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION. *Africa: Sierra Leone profile*. 2011-08-02. Retrieved from: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14094419>. 2012-04-13.

⁷⁶ UNITED NATIONS. *Sierra Leone – UNAMSIL – Background*. Retrieved from: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamsil/background.html>. 2012-04-13.

⁷⁷ BLAIR, Tony. *A Journey: My Political Life*. London: The Random House Group, 2010, p. 139.

Although this was a victorious example for Blair and Britain, his idea of the international community was not fulfilled enough. Blair's interest in advocating human rights remained selective. But one thing remained the same; it can be argued that has even grown - Blair's vision of him as a humanitarian warrior and his messianic tendencies. After the unpleasant feelings from Kosovo, Sierra Leone provided much needed boost of his personal concern. Sierra Leone gave Blair the 'blessing' to proceed with his foreign policy.

Afghanistan

The year 2001 was truly life-changing for Tony Blair. First, his close friend Bill Clinton was replaced by George W. Bush as the President of the US on January 20th 2001.⁷⁸ It was not a favourable change in Blair's eyes. For what counts, Bush was from the Republican Party, what could he have in common with Blair's and Clinton's values? At the last official dinner Clinton and Blair had in London, President Clinton gave Blair a piece of advice: *'Don't let your friendship with America wane, just because I'm gone.'*⁷⁹

In spring 2001 Blair had to solve several crises on the domestic scene. It was a variety of issues, from political scandals to the livestock disease. Blair had to postpone the General Election from May to June 7th 2001. The result of the election was not a surprise, although the turnout was quite small and the victory was not the same landslide as in 1997.⁸⁰ Blair started his second term in the office with several changes in the Cabinet. He offered Robin Cook the position of the Leader of the House of Commons. And Jack Straw, the Home Secretary, was offered the place of the Foreign Secretary. This decision was based on the common perception that Cook was rather hard to work with. And Blair did not favour how Cook conducted some aspects of the foreign policy without consulting him.⁸¹

⁷⁸ THE GUARDIAN. *Friend or foe? Police ready for allcomers on Bush's big day.* 2001-01-13. Retrieved from: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/jan/13/uselections2000.usa>. 2012-04-16.

⁷⁹ KAMPFNER, John. *Blair's Wars*. London: Free Press, 2003, p. 73.

⁸⁰ HINMAN, Bonnie. *Tony Blair. Modern World Leaders*. New York: Chelsea House, 2007, p. 89-91.

⁸¹ BLAIR, Tony. *A Journey: My Political Life*. London: The Random House Group, 2010, p. 190-191.

The event that has affected the rest of Blair's premiership took place on Tuesday September 11th 2001. Four US airplanes operating internal flights were hijacked by members of the terrorist organisation al-Qaeda. Two planes crashed deliberately into the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. The third plane collided into Pentagon in Washington DC. The fourth plane crashed in Pennsylvania after passengers of the plane tried to take control over the plane. The collision into Pentagon caused 180 lives and the collision in Pennsylvania caused 44 lives on board of the aircraft. The situation in New York City was much worse. The towers successively collapsed burying the estimated number of 5, 000 people in the debris.⁸²

Tony Blair was in a hotel room preparing for his speech to the Trades Union Congress in Brighton when the first plane hit the World Trade Center. Shortly after he heard of the attack, he spoke to the delegates at the congress: *'There have been most terrible, shocking events taking place in the United States of America within the last hour or so, including two hijacked planes being flown deliberately into the World Trade Centre. I'm afraid we can only imagine the terror and the carnage there, and the many, many innocent people that will have lost their lives. I know that you would want to join with me in sending the deepest condolences to President Bush and to the American people on behalf of the British people at these terrible events.'*⁸³

By the time of the collapse of the first tower, Blair was on his way back to London. Once there, he began emergency meetings with all members of the Cabinet and the intelligence agencies. The biggest

⁸² YOUNGS, Tim – OAKES, Mark – BOWERS, Paul. HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY. *11 September 2001: the response: Research Paper 01/72*. London: International Affairs and Defence Section, 2001, p. 9-10.

⁸³ KAMPFNER, John. *Blair's Wars*. London: Free Press, 2003, p. 110.

concern for all world leaders during the first hours after the attack was the safety of their respective territories and Blair was no exception. All defence facilities around the world, as well as the United Kingdom police, had been put on high alert. Financial and business institutions were advised about security measures.⁸⁴ Blair offered British support to the US: *'This is not a battle between the United States of America and terrorism, but between the free and democratic world and terrorism. We, therefore, here in Britain stand shoulder to shoulder with our American friends in this hour of tragedy, and we, like them, will not rest until this evil is driven from our world.'*⁸⁵

One of the important gestures from the international community took place on September 12th 2001. For the first time in history NATO applied the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty⁸⁶, known as the collective defence clause, saying that the terrorist attacks on the US represented attack on all NATO Member States. It was also the first time the reversed rhetoric appeared. The US was now in the position of the harmed state.⁸⁷

Soon it was obvious that Blair was not planning to end his support to the US only with words. Blair shared his views in the debate on international terrorism during the parliamentary recall on September 14th. He emphasised three urgent objectives in the light of the attacks, but did

⁸⁴ HILL, Christopher. Putting the world to rights: Tony Blair's foreign policy mission. In: SELDON, Anthony – KAVANGH, Dennis (eds.). *The Blair Effect 2001-2005: A Wasted Term?* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 388-389.

⁸⁵ HINMAN, Bonnie. *Tony Blair. Modern World Leaders*. New York: Chelsea House, 2007, p. 91.

⁸⁶ NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION. *Official texts (Chronological): The North Atlantic Treaty*. 1949-04-04. Retrieved from: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm. 2012-04-16.

⁸⁷ NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION. *NATO A-Z: Countering Terrorism*. Retrieved from: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_77646.htm?. 2012-04-16.

not state a precise response. The three main objectives were: *to bring to justice those responsible for the attacks; to form a common alliance against terrorism and maintain solidarity in support of any action; and to rethink the scale and nature of the action the world takes to combat terrorism to make it more effective.*⁸⁸

In the following days and weeks Blair continued with 'standing shoulder to shoulder' with the US. He and Bush agreed that quick diplomatic moves are necessary. The allies needed support from the international community. A legal political framework needed to be set. They both started calling fellow leaders of the international community to help build a coalition of nations to combat terrorism – as President Bush articulated 'the war on terror'. Blair showed to be a very skilled negotiator. He travelled literally around the whole world to talk to state leaders. In the name of his proclaimed 'bridge' he really helped to connect the US to the rest of the world. In the light of his success as a negotiator, his messianic tendencies started to emerge again. The aim was no smaller than to build the new world order.⁸⁹

It became apparent that some kind of response action had to be taken. The questions were how soon, how strong and most importantly, against whom those actions should be taken. Blair and Bush were discussing whether the planned actions should be directed only on al-Qaeda or whether they should, as well, include the Taleban that in fact ruled over Afghanistan. It was without question that the Taleban at least did not do anything to prevent al-Qaeda to operate from the Afghan territory. But the burning task was to resolve whether the Taliban could be

⁸⁸ YOUNGS, Tim – OAKES, Mark – BOWERS, Paul. HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY. *11 September 2001: the response: Research Paper 01/72*. London: International Affairs and Defence Section, 2001, p. 19.

⁸⁹ KAMPFNER, John. *Blair's Wars*. London: Free Press, 2003, p. 116-118.

directly connected to the attacks on September 11. Blair and Bush decided to take a military action towards al-Qaeda. Although they confirmed that the Taleban is not directly linked to the attacks, they saw the potential removal of the Taleban from Afghanistan as a positive effect of the planned operation. What Blair insisted on involving in the operation was the 'ethical dimension'. It meant that the military action should also keep in mind the refugees and provide all the possible humanitarian help they need. The problem with such words was that those were purely Blair's decisions during those days, not the Cabinet's, not British, just Blair's. With his rising importance on the world stage Tony Blair was losing the need to consult others.⁹⁰

On October 7th 2001 the US and the UK started the military operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. The allies reported their intention to the UN Security Council adverting to the Article 51 of the UN Charter about individual or collective self-defence. Both countries expressed their beliefs that risks to civilians were minimised by selecting proper targets. The main reason stated in favour of the need of such action was that al-Qaeda was likely to plan and execute further attacks and therefore it is a high threat for international security.⁹¹

At the start of the campaign Tony Blair gave a speech at Downing Street. In the speech he stated about Endurance Freedom: *'There are three parts, all equally important, to the operation in which we are engaged -- military, diplomatic and humanitarian...The military action we are taking will be targeted against places we know to be involved in the*

⁹⁰ KAMPFNER, John. *Blair's Wars*. London: Free Press, 2003, p. 118-120.

⁹¹ YOUNGS, Tim – OAKES, Mark – BOWERS, Paul. HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY. *Operation Enduring Freedom and the Conflict in Afghanistan: An Update: Research Paper 01/81*. London: International Affairs and Defence Section, 2001, p. 9-11.

al-Qaeda network of terror or against the military apparatus of the Taliban. The military plan has been put together mindful of our determination to do all we humanly can to avoid civilian casualties...On the diplomatic and political fronts, in the time I have been prime minister, I cannot recall a situation that has commanded so quickly such a powerful coalition of support -- not just from those countries directly involved in military action but from many others in all parts of the world...On the humanitarian front, we are assembling a coalition of support for refugees in and outside Afghanistan, which is as vital as the military coalition. Even before September 11, four million Afghans were on the move. There are two million refugees in Pakistan and one-and-a-half million in Iran.⁹²

There is a visible 'ethical dimension' link through the whole speech. His vision of the 'humanitarian intervention' was also included when he talked about putting together a coalition to gather support for refugees. It is also visible that he stood by his presumption of Britain as 'the bridge' between the US and Europe, only here this point was enlarged to the bridge between the US and the rest of the world. Blair's crusade for international democracy and justice continued in the embodiment of Afghanistan.

Endurance Freedom involved air strikes and special forces operations. Afghan forces that were opposing the Taleban also took part in those actions. The Taleban fled Kabul on November 13th 2001 and their control of territory was quickly reduced to one major city, Kandahar, and a few outlying pockets. The surrender of Kandahar came on December 7th 2001. The UN fostered talks in Germany in order to help

⁹² CABLE NEWS NETWORK. *World: Military Action: Attack on Afghanistan: Tony Blair statement*. 2001-10-07. Retrieved from: http://articles.cnn.com/2001-10-07/world/gen.blair.speech_1_military-action-taliban-regime-uk-forces?_s=PM:WORLD. 2012-04-16.

with establishing an interim administration in Afghanistan while the search for Osama bin Laden and his operatives from al-Qaeda continued.⁹³

The military operation in Afghanistan was very quick, including the liberation of Kabul. Removing the Taliban from its power was not the biggest challenge the allies faced. That was helping the Afghan nation with the post-conflict reconstruction. That means restoring democratic structures in the country, rebuilding means of communication and removing the need of humanitarian help from the country. Until present days those goals have not been fulfilled. What was the international community able to secure in Afghanistan were adoption of a new constitution, presidential elections in 2004 and 2009 and the national Assembly elections in 2005.⁹⁴ After almost ten years of chasing, Osama bin Laden was tracked down and subsequently killed on May 2nd 2011.⁹⁵

For Tony Blair the event became quite personal during the time. He could not understand the fact that some states will not want to help the US in the 'war of terror'. It was not understandable for him that some states will not participate in justice and change of regime that needed to be made in Afghanistan. In the first place, Afghanistan was not a case of humanitarian intervention for Blair, such as the previous conflicts were. It was the matter of justice. The words 'personal' and 'justice' characterised him from the event of Afghanistan on.

⁹³ YOUNGS, Tim – BOWERS, Paul – OAKES, Mark. HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY. *The Campaign against International Terrorism: Research Paper 01/112*. London: International Affairs and Defence Section, 2001, p. 9-12.

⁹⁴ CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. *The World Factbook: Afghanistan*. 2012-04-10. Retrieved from: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html>. 2012-04-16.

⁹⁵ THE GUARDIAN. *World News: Osama bin Laden is dead, Obama announces*. 2011-05-02. Retrieved from: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/02/osama-bin-laden-dead-obama>. 2012-04-16.

Iraq II

After the September 11th attacks most states of the international community had deplored such terrorist attacks. But only few of them wanted to support or even engage in further military action. Tony Blair and George Bush were both aware that removing al-Qaeda from Afghanistan is just a start of the 'war on terror'. In his State of the Union address in January 2002, President Bush articulated his vision of the current axis of evil. He named Iraq, Iran and North Korea as the states threatening international security. Tony Blair was convinced that the US was determined to take all necessary measures against Iraq. Tony Blair felt that there was no doubt whether the UK should support the US. His presumption was that also the European allies would be of the same opinion and the unity would help to achieve the UN mandate to conduct the military action. And the successful operation would be a memento for all states that intend to threaten the international security.⁹⁶

Contrary to Blair's presumption, the world leaders were not in the favour of such strike against the Iraq. Their reasoning was that there was no absolute proof that Iraq and Saddam Hussein personally had played any direct role in the September 11th attacks. They also thought that the containment policies introduced in the 1990's after the first dispute over Iraq were working. Prime Minister Blair and President Bush disagreed strongly and wanted to see some major changes done in Iraq, which included Hussein being ousted as president. Bush was certain that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. Saddam had previously used chemical weapons on some of his own people, and it was commonly

⁹⁶ CLARKE, Michael. Foreign Policy. In: SELDON, Anthony (ed.). *Blair's Britain 1997-2007*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 605-607.

believed that he also had biological weapons and was developing nuclear ones.⁹⁷

Tony Blair was concerned with Iraq and the situation long before President Bush was. But he supported diplomatic actions rather than military ones. The turning point came at the Crawford ranch in Texas in April 2002. Blair went to see Bush at his ranch to talk out the situation in Iraq. After this meeting it was clear that nothing stood in the way of Bush and his plan. The question was not anymore whether there will be a war. It was now when and how is the war going to be fought. Blair was set and ready to start another round of negotiations similar as he did in the case of Afghanistan. He also started to prepare the public on a military intervention.⁹⁸

The tension over war built through the Summer of 2002. Blair visited Bush in early September and did not persuade Bush to back down from planned military action. Blair supported the US Instead, but asked him to proceed in accordance with the UN. Blair wanted the UN Security Council to pass a resolution calling for Saddam Hussein to allow weapons inspectors back into Iraq as it was in the 1990's. The problem with Bush was that his advisors were appealing to him to avoid the UN resolution if possible. Blair's position was that any kind of military action in Iraq needed the approval of the international community.⁹⁹

Bush and Blair came to an agreement. The US would pursue the diplomatic solution if the measures taken by the UN bring disarmament of

⁹⁷ HINMAN, Bonnie. *Tony Blair: Modern World Leaders*. New York: Chelsea House, 2007, p. 96-98.

⁹⁸ KAMPFNER, John. *Blair's Wars*. London: Free Press, 2003, p. 166-169.

⁹⁹ HINMAN, Bonnie. *Tony Blair: Modern World Leaders*. New York: Chelsea House, 2007, p. 98-100.

Iraq. Blair's response was that the UK would go to the war alongside the US if the UN measures fail to work. Afterwards Blair published the intelligence findings about the presence of weapons of mass destruction on the territory of Iraq. He did that to show the public that there really is something to worry about. He was also counting with the fact that if the people knew the information in forehand, it would be easier to justify the possible action.¹⁰⁰

Blair was very relieved when Bush went before the UN on September 12th 2002 and delivered a speech in which he asked the Security Council to pass a new resolution. The resolution was calling for Hussein to allow weapons inspectors back into Iraq.¹⁰¹

After a difficult negotiating, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1441 on November 8th 2002. The resolution stated that Hussein had one final opportunity to comply with the UN by letting inspectors back into Iraq to make sure that there were not any weapons of mass destruction. The resolution had a problematic part. There were not included specific measures to be taken if Iraq would not comply or even how to measure its compliance. It was not clear whether a second resolution was needed in such case. Or whether was it automatic to take a military action if the Resolution 1441 would not be obeyed by Iraq.¹⁰²

¹⁰⁰ KAMPFNER, John. *Blair's Wars*. London: Free Press, 2003, p. 197-201.

¹⁰¹ CABLE NEWS NETWORK. *U.S. Afghanistan: President Bush's address to the United Nations*. 2002-09-12. Retrieved from: http://articles.cnn.com/2002-09-12/us/bush.transcript_1_generations-of-deceitful-dictators-commitment-peace-and-security?_s=PM:US. 2012-04-20.

¹⁰² UNITED NATIONS. *Security Council Resolution 1141 (2002) The situation between Iraq and Kuwait*. 2002-11-08. Retrieved from: <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/682/26/PDF/N0268226.pdf?OpenElement>. 2012-04-20.

Experts from the UN and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) arrived to Iraq on November 25th 2002. According the Resolution 1441 in thirty day was Hussein due to hand over a report on the arsenal of Iraq. On December 7th Iraq really did issue the report of 12,159 pages. It was handed over to the UN and IAEA experts. The experts claimed that it would take weeks to go through the documents and to verify the information. The report was containing mostly old information, or the information that was known from public sources or intelligence. The report did not include any paper work that Hussein got rid of the chemical and biological weapons that used to be possessed by Iraq. But on the other hand, the report also did not include any evidence that there actually are any weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. The main question everyone wanted an answer was whether Hussein had complied or hadn't. Bush and Blair held similar opinions. And even if they did not, back in April Blair promised Bush that Britain would stay loyal to the US. Tony Blair felt like Saddam Hussein had his last change and he misspent it.¹⁰³

By January 2003 the United States was insisting that Hussein had failed in compliance that was required. The United States started to ship troops and materials to the Middle East in order to prepare for military action. The US articulated that it needed help from Britain on the political level rather than on the military one. One of Blair's clearest goals during this time was to maintain the international alliance that Resolution 1441 had supposedly created. However, France and Germany had begun to pull back, and the relative vagueness of the resolution itself was not helpful. Blair wanted Bush to support a second resolution in the UN Security Council that would authorise military consequences for noncompliance on Iraq's side: He also wanted more time to convince

¹⁰³ KAMPFNER, John. *Blair's Wars*. London: Free Press, 2003, p. 223-232.

Hussein to step down and time to prepare British public on the event of war. Bush was not able to give Blair clear promises to his demands. Meanwhile Blair used every bit of his negotiating skills to build a majority within the UN Security Council that would be in favour of passing another resolution on the matter of Iraq. He also did everything he could to persuade his own Labour Party members to support a possible intervention in Iraq. For the first time in his political career, Blair found it difficult to bring others to his point of view.¹⁰⁴

In early March 2003 the chief of the UN experts in Iraq claimed that Iraq has accelerated its cooperation but more time is needed to verify Iraq's compliance. On March 17th George W. Bush articulated a 48-hour ultimatum towards Hussein and his sons to leave Iraq. The consequence of the refusal was about to be a military operation. Later that day the Foreign Secretary Jack Straw stated that Iraq has failed to comply according the UN Resolution 1441 and criticised states that were of a different opinion. Following Straw's statement the Leader of the House of Commons Robin Cook, the predecessor of Straw in the FCO, resigned from his position stating that the prepared operation is not backed by the international community, therefore it is wrong.¹⁰⁵

On March 18th Blair gave a speeches to the Labour Party members of Parliament and then to the entire House of Commons. He spoke in favour of executing a military action together with the US against Iraq. The voting at the end of Blair's speech to the House of Commons resulted in supporting the Prime Minister. Although was the decision

¹⁰⁴ HINMAN, Bonnie. *Tony Blair: Modern World Leaders*. New York: Chelsea House, 2007, p. 98-102.

¹⁰⁵ TAILOR, Claire - YOUNGS. HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY. *The Conflict in Iraq: Research Paper 03/50*. London: International Affairs and Defence Section, 2003, p. 8-11.

hardly unanimous. The same day were all the UN personnel withdrawn from Iraq. On March 20th 2003 after the 48-hour ultimatum expired, President Bush declared that the military operation Iraqi Freedom is being executed. Tony Blair articulated the aims of the mission: *'To remove Saddam Hussein from power, and disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction.'*¹⁰⁶ The Russian, French, Chinese and Syrian political leaders condemned the military action.¹⁰⁷

The war went better than Blair could have expected, at least from a military viewpoint. British soldiers were given an important role. Although there were many casualties, the number was much less than anticipated. Within three weeks, Iraqis in Baghdad had torn down a huge statue of Saddam Hussein that stood in a city square. In another three weeks, President Bush proclaimed the end of major military actions.¹⁰⁸

The evidence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq did not appear. The threat of weapons of mass destruction was the main reason that Blair had used as a justification go to war against Iraq. Blair himself thought that regime change was enough reason, but he knew that his position wasn't shared by most politicians and public in Britain. There were accusations that Blair deliberately exaggerated the threat to make people in Britain believe that the war was necessary.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁶ THE GUARDIAN. *News: Politics: 'Britain has never been a nation to hide at the back'*. 2003-03-21. Retrieved from: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2003/mar/21/uk.iraq> 2012-04-20.

¹⁰⁷ TAILOR, Claire - YOUNGS. HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY. *The Conflict in Iraq: Research Paper 03/50*. London: International Affairs and Defence Section, 2003, p. 12-21.

¹⁰⁸ BOWERS, Paul. HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY. *Iraq: law of occupation. Research Paper 03/51*. London: International Affairs and Defence Section, 2003, p. 7-11.

¹⁰⁹ HINMAN, Bonnie. *Tony Blair. Modern World Leaders*. New York: Chelsea House, 2007, p. 105-110.

Tony Blair has left the office in June 2007 after the third successful General Elections. The controversy of joining the US in the war in Iraq led to establishment of the inquiry in June 2009. The task of the inquiry was to reveal the initiation of and conduct of the war in Iraq. All people from Blair's closest circle and even Blair himself were asked to testify at the hearings. The final report of the inquiry is due to be issued in Summer 2012.¹¹⁰

The decision to enter war in Iraq alongside the US showed to be unfortunate. The justification of what was in fact a war for regime change as a war to eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction emerged as dishonest to the international community. One of Blair's missteps was that he leaned on the security services. Tony Blair and George W. Bush were fighting a war for two different reasons. For President Bush Iraq was a demonstration of raw power to achieve a national purpose. For Blair it was about justice and the international community. But the failure of the aftermath of the Iraqi Freedom operation cannot be laid on Blair alone. Britain's contribution to the calamity is far smaller than of the US. But morally, even if not numerically, Blair did as many missteps as George W. Bush.

¹¹⁰ SMITH, Ben. HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY. *Chilcot Inquiry: An update: Standard Note SNIA/6215*. London: International Affairs and Defence Section, 2012, p. 2-5.

Conclusion

Concerning the electoral matter, Tony Blair was the most successful leader of the Labour Party in its history. His vision for Britain managed to attract wide variety of voters in all three General Elections he lead the Labour Party into. His premiership was full of paradoxes. In the domestic policy he managed to make the concept of the Third Way work. With his renewed Labour Party, known as New Labour, he continued with the Thatcherite legacy, especially with the economic measures his government took.

On the international stage he was an anticipated fresh change compared to his predecessor John Major. The first encounters with foreign policy were unsure for Blair. Thus it is no wonder that the first official statement on foreign policy of the UK was given by the Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, not by the Prime Minister Blair. As the time went by, Blair's confidence as the Prime Minister has grown immensely. He started as a personal friend of the US President Bill Clinton and has turned into one of the key world leaders.

The first military operation he went into was by the side of the US. It can be argued that the dispute in Iraq in 1998 would not even have to happen if the allied forces had restrained Saddam Hussein in the first place. This operation clearly showed Blair's desire for the 'Special Relationship' to evolve even in an extended matter. The US was the only world super power in the 1990s. But with our current world order, even a super power needs allies to help it, for example on the floor of the UN Security Council or in NATO. And Britain under Blair's premiership was eager to take that place. Blair himself defined it as being the bridge between Europe and the US.

After the basic formation of Blair's vision for Britain as being the bridge and a proactive country on the international stage, Blair formulated his personal values he wanted to pursue in the foreign policy. This transformation started with the conflict in Kosovo in 1999. With his 'doctrine of international community' and the concept of 'humanitarian interventions' his journey as an international crusader for democracy and justice began. This practically meant that the external sovereignty of a state can be violated for sake of human rights.

This concept was verified as a right solution to pursue in Sierra Leone. With the mandate from the international community Britain did the right thing that needed to be done. One thing about this operation is yet different. There was no US ally by British side. Britain was in the lead now. It can be argued that this has even strengthened Blair's vision of himself as of the true world leader. The Prime Minister stood by the idea that what was in the global interest, was at Britain's interest.

The shocking moment came on September 11th 2001 with the terrorist attack on the US. All the clues led to al-Qaeda, a terrorist group operating from Afghanistan. In less than a month Tony Blair and the US President George W. Bush were able to gather a coalition supporting military strikes in the name of defence. Tony Blair showed as a skilful negotiator within those days. He very much contributed to the international community's decision to approve the military strikes. For Blair personally, the events of September 11th 2001 were a turning point. He started to put more stress on justice, rather than on the ethical dimension. His personal involvement in the events also grew. His star as the key world player was at the top by that time and Blair was aware of that. He was not afraid to put his name behind as many actions as necessary. Although it was clear that he was a bit enchanted by his

position, it is without doubts that his intentions were really concerned with the justice.

For many commentators, voters and even members of the Labour Party Iraq has been a disaster and blighted Blair's premiership. Saddam Hussein had been in Blair's sights for a long time. Until the invasion in March 2003, he had worked at justifying such action towards Hussein's regime. He certainly welcomed the participation of the US, but was calling for action long before the election of George W. Bush. The decision to go to war met a significant opposition from the public and Labour MPs, but was backed by the Cabinet – except for Robin Cook – and the Parliament. Despite this fact, it was very much Blair's personal decision and he has never apologised for it. He believed that at the time it was the right thing to do. It was justice.

There was an undoubted moral dimension to Blair's analyses of world events. It was probably a consequence of his determination to push certain views and actions in international affairs. In his closeness to the US, Blair damaged Britain's relations with Germany and France and ruined his hopes of acting as a bridge between the EU and the US. In the future, British public, Parliament and Cabinet are more likely to be sceptical about the evidence a Prime Minister presents when dragging the UK into any kind of military action.

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Internet Resources

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IDNES.CZ	http://zpravy.idnes.cz
KING´S COLLEGE LONDON	http://www.kcl.ac.uk
LABOUR PARTY	http://www.labour.org.uk
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION	http://www.nato.int
THE GUARDIAN	http://www.guardian.co.uk
THE LONDON SPEAKER BUREAU	http://www.londonspeakerbureau.in
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UK PARLIAMENT WEBSITE	http://www.parliament.uk
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Resumé

Diese Abschlussarbeit beschäftigt sich mit Tony Blair, als er zehn Jahre lang als der Ministerpräsident des Vereinigten Königreichs diente, und sie analysiert seine Außenpolitik. Im Mittelpunkt steht die Frage, ob seines Programm, seine Hauptreden und Leitbilder den realen Handlungen zustimmen. Man analysiert, ob die festgesetzten Ziele dieser Handlungen erreicht wurden.

Der Erste Teil dieser Arbeit beschreibt, wie Tony Blair der Chef der britischen Labour-Partei geworden ist und in welcher Form er zu der Gründung der New Labour beigetragen hat. Der Schwerpunkt liegt darin, die Folgen zu analysieren, die zu der Schaffung eines Rahmens der britischen Außenpolitik beigetragen haben. Der erste Abschnitt konfrontiert die vorher gemachten Erklärungen mit den realen Handlungen.

Der zweite Teil beschreibt fünf militärische Auseinandersetzungen, für die Tony Blair als Ministerpräsident ständig war. Es umfasst die Konflikte in Irak, Kosovo, Sierra Leone und Afghanistan. Diese Konflikte werden chronologisch geordnet. Alle fünf Teile umfassen die Hintergrund einzelnen Auseinandersetzungen, die Beteiligung des Vereinigten Königreichs und die Einstellung der internationalen Gemeinschaft gegen den entsprechenden Konflikt. Folglich hat man darüber nachgedenkt, von welchen inneren Bewegungen Tony Blair beeinflusst wurde und ob diese Bewegungen seinen gemachten Erklärungen entsprochen haben.