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dc.contributor.authorVizi, László Tamás
dc.date.accessioned2021-07-14T07:10:43Z
dc.date.available2021-07-14T07:10:43Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.identifier.citationWest Bohemian Historical Review. 2021, no. 1, p. 25-48.en
dc.identifier.issn1804-5480
dc.identifier.urihttp://wbhr.cz/images/issues/WBHR_2021_1.pdf
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11025/44890
dc.format24 s.cs
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherZápadočeská univerzita v Plznics
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWest Bohemian Historical Reviewen
dc.rights© Západočeská univerzita v Plznics
dc.subjecttrianoncs
dc.subjectrevizecs
dc.subjectAlbert Apponyics
dc.subjectIstván Bethlencs
dc.subjectSopronské referendumcs
dc.titleThe Ideas of Hungarian Politics on Revision in the First Half of the 1920sen
dc.typečlánekcs
dc.typearticleen
dc.rights.accessopenAccessen
dc.type.versionpublishedVersionen
dc.description.abstract-translatedIn the first half of the 1920s, the Hungarian political elite had to handle the situation created by the Trianon Treaty, although the Hungarian foreign politics had very little room for manoeuvres against the Little Entente and for the revision of the Trianon Treaty. The question arose that without the support of a major power how realistic the plans for breaking the ring of the Little Entente around Hungary were, or whether it was worth attempting a foreign political action against any Little Entente member state with a minimum chance of success without the support of a major power. There were three possible responses to the question: (1) waiting and avoiding any unilateral Hungarian speculative actions until the support of a major power was given; (2) active Hungarian actions without the support of a major power; (3) taking maximum advantage of all changing international circumstances while seeking the support of a major power. This article analyses the three options and those groups that supported them. The conclusion is that the Sopron referendum, which managed to alter the Treaty of Trianon, demonstrated that the Treaty of Trianon borders could be partly modified with the support of major powers and that the right for self-determination of the people based on the Wilsonian principles could not be swept completely under the rug partially and slightly. However, we should not forget that the referendum that attempted to remedy the territorial disputes accompanied by armed clashes between the two defeated nations, was a solution which could not be implemented at the beginning of the 1920s with the other victorious successor states. As it turned out, this solution was not even applicable later. The referendum was not supported by the major powers, neither by the successor states. The latter firmly rejected it. With the rejection of the idea of referendums, it was exactly that resolution and crisis management method, which was eliminated from the options list, the one which could have offered a peaceful and comforting solution for all the parties concerned to heal the wounds caused by Trianonen
dc.subject.translatedtrianonen
dc.subject.translatedrevisionen
dc.subject.translatedAlbert Apponyien
dc.subject.translatedIstván Bethlenen
dc.subject.translatedSopron Referendumen
dc.type.statusPeer-revieweden
Vyskytuje se v kolekcích:Číslo 1 (2021)
Číslo 1 (2021)

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